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RACE TO JUDGMENT? AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF
SCOTT V. HARRIS AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Amelia G. Yowell*
INTRODUCTION
In three of the most cited cases in its history, the U.S. Supreme
Court strongly encouraged the use of summary judgment as an effi-
cient way to rid the federal dockets of frivolous claims before expen-
sive trials.' After this trilogy of decisions, scholars expressed concern
about the heavy use of summary judgment.2 Two decades later, most
of the judicial and scholarly world seemed content again with the state
of summary judgment.3 Then came Scott v. Harris.4 With a video link
included underneath the Supreme Court's decision, it is hard to imag-
ine a more modern test of the relationship between judges, evidence,
and summary judgment.
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2011; B.G.S., Political
Science, University of Kansas, 2008. Many thanks to Professor Jay Tidmarsh for his
advice and encouragement, Dean Margaret Brinig for her help with the statistical
analysis, the members of Notre Dame Law Review for their diligent editing, and Kendall
Hannon for his comments and support. I would also like to thank my family,
especially my parents, and friends for their patience and support.
1 See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986); Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475
U.S. 574 (1986).
2 See Patricia M. Wald, Summary judgment at Sixty, 76 TEx. L. REv. 1897, 1914-17,
1942 (1998) ("Rough justice may well be taking place in the corner-cutting practice I
have described-the system may be surviving by weeding out marginal cases that
would exact from the courts as well as the litigants costly and useless resources if
permitted to go to trial. But that judgment ought to be made more openly, by
changes to Rule 56, rather than covertly."); MarcyJ. Levine, Comment, SummaryJudg-
ment: The Majority View Undergoes a Complete Reversal in the 1986 Supreme Court, 37 EMORY
L.J. 171, 206-15 (1988) (providing a discussion of lower court decisions two years
following the trilogy).
3 SeeJohn Bronsteen, Against SummaryJudgment, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 522, 525
(2007) (noting that "detractors have been all but drowned out in a sea of support" for
summary judgment).
4 550 U.S. 372 (2007).
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Summary judgment is perhaps the most important tool in evalu-
ating the legal sufficiency of a claim. Once ajudge grants a summary
judgment motion, the claim is barred from ajury.5 A granted motion
also bars the cause of action for purposes of claim and issue preclu-
sion.6 Because the impact of summary judgment is expansive, the way
federal courts decide summary judgment motions ultimately deter-
mines whether a claim continues to ajury or, perhaps, a lucrative set-
tlement. Therefore, the legal community understandably takes notice
when it appears that the summary judgment framework has changed.
In reading Scott, one thing becomes obvious: the majority relied
heavily upon a videotape portraying a high-speed car chase in revers-
ing the lower courts' denials of summaryjudgment.7 The defendants'
summary judgment motion concerned the plaintiffs argument that a
police officer had used excessive force during the chase.8 While both
lower courts discussed other evidence, including testimony from the
parties,9 the Supreme Court needed only one short grainy tape to
make its conclusion: the officer's actions, which resulted in severe and
lasting injuries to the plaintiff, were reasonable under the circum-
stances and thus did not constitute excessive force.10 In this decision,
the Supreme Court did not make an express change to summary judg-
ment rules." However, many scholars are concerned that the Court's
lenient attitude toward summary judgment will have a substantive
effect on summary judgment decisions.12
In interpreting Scott, scholars have disagreed about the scope of
the decision. Does it signal another large increase in the granting of
all summary judgment motions?' 3 Or is its impact limited to cases
5 See 1OA CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 2712 (3d ed. 1998).
6 See id.
7 See Scott, 550 U.S. at 378-81.
8 Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment at 9-10, 12-21, Harris v. Coweta
County, No. 3:01-CV-148, 2003 WL 25419527 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 25, 2003), affd, 433 F.3d
807 (11th Cir. 2005), rev'd sub nom. Scott, 550 U.S. 372.
9 See Harris, 433 F.3d at 815-17; Harris, 2003 WL 25419527, at *1-7.
10 See Scott, 550 U.S. at 378-81.
11 See id. at 378.
12 See, e.g., George M. Dery III, The Needless "Slosh" Through the "Morass of Reasona-
bleness": The Supreme Court's Usurpation of Fact Finding Powers in Assessing Reasonable Force
in Scott v. Harris, 18 GEO. MASON U. CIv. RTs. L.J. 417, 436-48 (2008); Martin A.
Schwartz et al., Analysis of Videotape Evidence in Police Misconduct Cases, 25 ToURO L.
REv. 857, 860-63 (2009).
13 See, e.g., Richard Marcus, Confessions of a Federal "Bureaucrat": The Possibilities of
Perfecting Procedural Reform, 35 W. ST. U. L. REv. 103, 109-110 (2007); Jack B. Wein-
stein, The Role ofJudges in a Government of by, and for the People: Notes for the Fify-Eighth
Cardozo Lecture, 30 CARDozo L. REv. 1, 122-25 (2008).
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that are factually similar?1 4 This Note seeks to answer these questions
through an empirical study. The study analyzes how district courts-
the initial decision makers confronted with summary judgment
motions-have used Scott. The rates of district court decisions on
56(c) motions for summary judgment provide a useful first look at
Scott's impact.
The results of this study suggest three conclusions. First, Scott has
had little to no substantive impact on summary judgment rates overall.
Second, there has been a significant decrease in denial rates in those
cases that cite to Scott, suggesting that Scott does have an impact within
a limited scope. Third, there has been a remarkable increase in the
number of cases dealing with videotape evidence after Scott.' 5 In
exploring these results, this Note proceeds in four parts. Part I pro-
vides context for the study by examining the state of summary judg-
ment before and after Scott as well as discussing the literature's
response to Scott. Part II presents the methodology of the empirical
study while Part III presents the results. Part IV offers several explana-
tions for the results suggested by the study.
I. HiSTORICAL AND ACADEMIC CONTEXT
A. History and Development of Summary judgment
According to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, a court should
grant a summary judgment motion if "the pleadings, the discovery
and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law."16 Introduced in 1938, the purpose of
Rule 56 was to provide speedy, cheap relief from dockets burdened by
frivolous issues.1 7 A 1963 amendment made it clear that summary
judgment should "pierce the pleadings and . . . assess the proof in
14 See, e.g., Jessica Silbey, Cross-Examining Film, 8 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GEN-
DER & CLASs 17, 24-25 (2008); Howard M. Wasserman, Orwell's Vision: Video and the
Future of Civil Rights Enforcement, 68 MD. L. REv. 600, 607-10 (2009).
15 While there is a large increase, the small number of cases dealing with video
evidence before Scott made it impossible to determine the statistical significance of
this analysis.
16 FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
17 See Broderick Wood Prods. Co. v. United States, 195 F.2d 433, 435-36 (10th
Cir. 1952) ("The purpose of the rule is to provide against the vexation and delay
which comes from the formal trial of cases in which there is not substantial issue of
fact, and to permit expeditious disposition of cases of that kind."); see also Levine,
supra note 2, at 171-73 (providing a brief history of Rule 56).
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order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial."' Before Rule
56, cases either settled or went to trial.19 Now, "summary judgment
stands alongside trial and settlement as a pillar of our system."20
Until about a decade before the trilogy, the judiciary cautiously
interpreted Rule 56 and rarely granted summary judgment motions.21
Judges were primarily fearful of denying litigants the right to trial.22
This practice provoked Judge Charles Clark, a member of the original
federal rules advisory board, to come to summary judgment's
defense. 23 In a fiery dissent, Judge Clark declared, "Of course it is
error to deny trial when there is a genuine dispute of facts; but it is
just as much error-perhaps more in cases of hardship, or where
impetus is given to strike suits-to deny or postpone judgment where
the ultimate legal result is clearly indicated."24 Clark's concerns about
underuse fell on deaf ears; judges continued to consider summary
judgment the exception, not the rule.25
In 1986, the Supreme Court signaled a shift in judicial attitude
toward 56(c) summary judgment motions in the trilogy. 26 In the first
trilogy decision, Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 27
the Court rejected the common belief that the nonmoving party must
prove only the slightest doubt in the evidence.28 Instead, the party
must prove a factual dispute that is reasonable.29 In Anderson v. Liberty
18 FED. R. Civ. P. 56 advisory committee's note. Therefore, summary judgment
must occur after some factfinding so that the court can assess whether there would be
enough evidence to support the allegations. See id.
19 See Bronsteen, supra note 3, at 522-25, 536-39.
20 Id. at 523.
21 See, e.g., Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970) (refusing to
grant summary judgment because the defendant had not offered evidence that
affirmatively "foreclose [d] the possibility" of what the plaintiff alleged). But seeJoe S.
Cecil et al., A Quarter-Century of Summary judgment Practice in Six Federal District Courts, 4
J. EMPiRiCAL LEGAL STUD. 861, 881-906 (2007) (arguing that the trilogy merely con-
firmed a shift that had already taken place).
22 See Wald, supra note 2, at 1898-1907.
23 See Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 479-80 (2d Cir. 1946) (Clark, J., dissent-
ing); see also Wald, supra note 2, at 1898-1904 (providing further background infor-
mation about the Clark-Frank debates).
24 Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 480 (Clark, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
25 See Wald, supra note 2, at 1904-07 (arguing that Clark's view prevailed in the
end).
26 Some commentators argue that the trilogy just confirmed a shift that had
already occurred in lower courts. See Cecil et al., supra note 21, at 881-906; Paul W.
Mollica, Federal Summary judgment at High Tide, 84 MARQ. L. REV. 141, 163 (2000).
27 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
28 See id. at 586 (holding that the nonmovant has to "do more than simply show
that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts").
29 See id. at 586-87.
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Lobby, Inc.,30 the Court held that the standard for granting a motion
for summary judgment is the same as that under a directed verdict
and, in deciding whether that standard has been fulfilled at the sum-
mary judgment stage, courts should use the same burden of proof as
they would at trial.3 1 In the seminal trilogy decision, Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett,32 the Court shifted its focus to the movant, reducing his bur-
den by holding that the movant does not need to establish the
absence of material fact.33 By simultaneously lowering the burden on
the movant and raising the burden on the nonmovant, these decisions
suggested that the use of summary judgment would increase.34
After the trilogy, many scholars stopped worrying about the
underuse of summary judgment and focused instead on its overuse.35
Decreased trial rates especially fueled the debate about summary judg-
ment.3 6 Many scholars have worried about the scope of summary
judgment, fearing that it could cause judges to go beyond their tradi-
tional power.3 7 Others have questioned the constitutional grounds of
summary judgment itself.3 8 In a recent article about the trilogy, Pro-
fessor Miller concludes:
One primary function of the jury has been to make commonsense
determinations about human behavior, reasonableness, and state of
mind based on objective standards, the paradigm being the reasona-
ble person standard. Since the Supreme Court trilogy, there is evi-
dence that these responsibilities have been taken away from juries
.... Given the existing, convoluted jurisprudence, it is imperative
that the Supreme Court provide some clarity rather than leaving the
matter entirely to the genial anarchy of trial court discretion.39
30 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
31 See id. at 252-55.
32 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
33 See id. at 325.
34 Cf Cecil et al., supra note 21, at 881-906 (providing an empirical response to
these claims).
35 See, e.g., id. at 864-69; Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in
Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 494, 511-12, 529-30 (1986); Wald, supra note 2, at 1935.
36 See, e.g., Gillian Hadfield, Where Have All the Trials Gone?, I J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUD. 705, 706-12 (2004).
37 See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
38 See, e.g., Suja A. Thomas, Essay, Why Summary Judgment Is Unconstitutional, 93
VA. L. REv. 139, 145-60 (2007) (arguing that summary judgment is unconstitutional
under the Seventh Amendment).
39 Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to judgment: Are the "Litigation Explosion," "Lia-
bility Crisis, " and Efficiency Cliches Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial Commitments?,
78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 982, 1134 (2003).
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The recent Supreme Court decision in Scott v. Harris has renewed
the discussion about the proper scope of summary judgment.40
Instead of clarifying the proper place of summary judgment, the
Supreme Court only muddied the water with its decision in Scott.4 1
Scott dealt primarily with the proper role of the judge in determining
whether a genuine issue of fact exists. 42 The Court had previously
held that "at the summary judgment stage the judge's function is not
himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter
but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial."4 3 Fur-
thermore, " [i]f reasonable minds could differ as to the import of the
evidence . . . a verdict should not be directed."44 The Court also held
that a judge must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-
moving party and consider "'evidence supporting the moving party
that is uncontradicted and unimpeached, at least to the extent that
that evidence comes from disinterested witnesses." 45 While Scott did
not explicitly replace this standard, some have argued that its attitude
broadened the scope of summary judgment motions.46
B. Scott v. Harris
On a dark Georgia night, Victor Harris sped down a two-lane
road at seventy-three miles per hour.47 A deputy caught Harris speed-
ing in the fifty-five miles per hour zone and turned on his lights. 48
Instead of pulling over, Harris led a high-speed chase.49 Deputy
Timothy Scott heard the call for backup and joined the chase.50 Dur-
40 See infra Part I.C.
41 See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378-81 (2007).
42 See id.
43 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986).
44 Id. at 250-51.
45 Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 151 (2000) (quoting
9A CHARLEs ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 2529, at 300 (2d ed. 1995) (discussing the standard in the context of a Rule 50
judgment as a matter of law, which uses the same standard as a Rule 56 summary
judgment).
46 See infra Part I.C.







ing the chase, Harris managed to escape a cruiser blockade in a park-
ing lot, but collided with Scott's cruiser in the process. 51
Following this incident, Scott took over as the main police cruiser
in the pursuit.52 Scott obtained approval from his supervisor to come
into contact with Harris through the Precision Intervention Tech-
nique (PIT) maneuver.53 A PIT maneuver requires the officer to hit
the fleeing car at a specific point, throwing the car into a spin.54 Scott
did not know the underlying offense for the chase (speeding), but he
told his supervisor that he felt Harris was acting in a reckless and dan-
gerous manner.55 The supervisor responded, "Go ahead and take
him out."5 6 Deciding that Harris was traveling too fast, Scott hit Har-
ris's car in a manner that was not a part of the PIT maneuver.57 Harris
lost control of the vehicle, which ran down an embankment and
crashed.58 As a result, Harris was rendered a quadriplegic.59 A cam-
era on Scott's cruiser captured the incident.60
Harris sued under § 198361 alleging, among other claims, that
Scott had used excessive force to end the high-speed chase in viola-
tion of the Fourth Amendment.62 Scott then filed a motion for sum-
mary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity.6 3 Determining
whether an officer is entitled to qualified immunity under § 1983 is an
inherently factual determination. 64 As part of that analysis, the North-
ern District Court of Georgia asked whether a reasonable jury could
find that Scott violated Harris's Fourth Amendment rights by the use
51 The parties disagreed. See id. at *1 n.2 ("Defendants assert that Harris was
boxed in by the officers and deliberately rammed Scott's cruiser in an attempt to get
away. Harris maintains that the crash was unintentional.").




56 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
57 See id. The Supreme Court noted that it is "irrelevant to our analysis whether
Scott had permission to take the precise actions he took." Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S.
372, 375 n.1 (2007).
58 Harris, 2003 WL 25419527, at *2.
59 Id.
60 Id. at *1.
61 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
62 Complaint at 11-15, Harris, 2003 WL 25419527 (No. 3:01-CV-148).
63 Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 8, at 28-31.
64 See Dery, supra note 12, at 419-25.
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of excessive force. 65 Excessive force claims are subject to an objective
reasonableness standard.6 6
The district court denied the motion for summary judgment,
holding that a jury could find "Scott's use of force-ramming the car
while traveling at high speeds-was not in proportion to the risk that
Harris posed, and therefore was objectively unreasonable." 6 7 The dis-
trict court made no mention of the video in its analysis of the motion,
instead emphasizing the facts as seen from the nonmovant.68 Men-
tioning the video only in a footnote, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the
district court's decision.6 9 The court noted that, from the video, a
reasonable jury could find that Harris did not pose an immediate risk
of danger because he was driving in a nonaggressive fashion in front
of the squad cars on a road with little to no pedestrian traffic. 70 This
could be in line with the nonmovant's view that "Harris remained in
control of his vehicle, slowed for turns and intersections, and typically
used his indicators for turns."7 1
The Supreme Court reversed the decisions of the lower courts.72
The Court based its decision on the videotape, which had been an
afterthought to the lower courts.7 3 Writing the majority opinion, Jus-
65 The district court employed the two-part Saucier test for qualified immunity:
(1) Can the facts alleged establish a constitutional violation?; and (2) If so, was the
right clearly established so that it would have been clear to a reasonable officer that
Scott's conduct was unlawful? See Harris, 2003 WL 25419527, at *6 (citing Saucier v.
Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201-02 (2001), overruled by Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808
(2009)). Both the district court and the court of appeals discussed genuine issues of
fact on both prongs of the test. See Harris v. Coweta County, 433 F.3d 807, 811-22
(11th Cir. 2005); Harris, 2003 WL 25419527, at *4-7. The Supreme Court, however,
only reached the first prong. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 377-86 (2007). The
Court declined to evaluate the rigid two-prong Saucier test, which has since been over-
ruled by Pearson. See id. at 377 n.4.
66 See Harris, 550 U.S. at 381 ("It is also conceded, by both sides, that a claim of
'excessive force in the course of making [a] . . . "seizure" of [the] person . . . [is]
properly analyzed under the Fourth Amendment's "objective reasonableness" stan-
dard.'" (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989) (alterations in origi-
nal))). Graham instructs courts to evaluate the facts carefully and offers examples of
questions relevant to that evaluation: "(1) how severe was the crime at issue; (2)
whether the suspect posed an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others;
and (3) whether he was attempting to evade arrest by flight." Harris, 2003 WL
25419527, at *4 (citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 396).
67 Scott, 2003 WL 25419527, at *5.
68 See id. at *4-6.
69 See Harris, 433 F.3d at 816 & n.11.
70 See id.
71 Id. at 815-16.
72 Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 386 (2007).
73 See id. at 378-81.
1766 [VOL. 85:4
RACE TO JUDGMENT?
tice Scalia declared that, when faced with a motion for summary judg-
ment, courts should "view the facts and draw reasonable inferences 'in
the light most favorable to the party opposing the [summary judg-
ment] motion."' 7 4 Scalia went on to explain, however, that "[w]hen
opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly
contradicted by the record," the court should not adopt that party's
version of the facts, even if the party is the nonmovant.7 5
The majority opinion held that the lower courts should not have
rested on "such visible fiction."7 6 For the majority, Harris's view of the
events was "so utterly discredited by the record that no reasonable jury
could have believed him."7 7 Therefore, the Court declined to view
the facts from the nonmovant's point of view.78 Instead, the Court
characterized the facts for itself primarily from the video: "Far from
being the cautious and controlled driver the lower court depicts, what
we see on the video more closely resembles a Hollywood-style car
chase of the most frightening sort, placing police officers and inno-
cent bystanders alike at great risk of serious injury."79 Based on these
facts, the Court held that the risk Harris posed to the officers and
pedestrians justified the use of excessive force, entitling Scott to sum-
mary judgment.80
Justices Ginsburg and Breyer concurred in the judgment.8 1
NeitherJustice thought that the Court should instate a per se rule that
excessive force used to prevent harm to civilians is always reasona-
ble. 82 Instead, they believed that the Court "must still slosh our way
through the factbound morass of 'reasonableness.' "8 Breyer briefly
mentioned the video by encouraging the reader to view the tape for
herself.84 Breyer agreed with the majority that no reasonable jury
could find that Scott violated the Fourth Amendment.85
74 Id. at 378 (quoting United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962)
(alterations in original)).
75 Id. at 380.
76 Id. at 380-81.
77 Id. at 380.
78 See id.
79 Id. at 380.
80 See id. at 386.
81 See id. at 386-87 (Ginsburg, J., concurring); id. at 387-89 (Breyer, J.,
concurring).
82 See id. at 386 (Ginsburg, J., concurring); id. at 389 (Breyer, J., concurring).
83 Id. at 386 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (quoting id. at 383 (majority opinion)).
84 See id. at 387 (Breyer, J., concurring).
85 See id.
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Justice Stevens was the sole dissenter.86 Stevens suggested that
the video actually confirmed the lower courts' decisions on the factual
questions.87 Offering an extensive analysis of the tape, Stevens con-
cluded that a jury could agree with Harris's version of the facts-that
he was in control of the car and did not pose a high risk to the officers
or other pedestrians."8 Stevens noted that most cars had pulled over
in anticipation of the police sirens and that Harris had waited for
other cars to pass before changing lanes.8 9 In any case, the video was
"hardly the stuff of Hollywood."90
I Apart from merely disagreeing about the characterization of the
videotape, Stevens claimed that even if the Justices believed that the
use of force was reasonable, this view did not justify depriving Harris
of his right to have a jury determine that question.91 Stevens argued
that the Court was essentially calling the four other judges who
reviewed the case unreasonable. 92 To Stevens, the fact that these
judges all offered differing opinions on the evidence poignantly illus-
trated the genuine issue of material fact.93 He argued that a Georgia
jury would be the best body to evaluate the conduct that occurred
because Georgia residents would be most familiar with the roads and
local practices.94
C. Academic Context
In analyzing the procedural portion of Scott, there are two main
interpretations: the first interpretation confines the application of the
case strictly to its facts-most significantly the use of video evidence-
while the second branches outside the facts of the case to see a gen-
eral encouragement of the use of summary judgment. The majority
of scholarship on Scott can hardly be considered complimentary of the
86 See id. at 389-97 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
87 See id. at 390 n.1 ("Had they learned to drive when most high-speed driving
took place on two-lane roads rather than on superhighways-when split-second judg-
ments about the risk of passing a slowpoke in the face of oncoming traffic were rou-
tine-they might well have reacted to the videotape more dispassionately.").
88 See id. at 391.
89 See id. 391-93.
90 Id. at 392.
91 See id. at 390 ("[It surely does not provide a principled basis for depriving the
respondent of his right to have a jury evaluate the question whether the police
officers' decision to use deadly force to bring the chase to an end was reasonable.").
92 See id. at 395.
93 See id.
94 See id. at 397.
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Supreme Court's analysis. This subpart examines the different inter-
pretations of Scott and the tools scholars have used to reach them.
On one reading, Scott may have set forth a blanket encourage-
ment for the increase of grants on all summary judgment motions in
general.9 5 While the discussion of summary judgment occurs within
the context of video evidence, the Court's overall attitude in the opin-
ion could send strong signals to the lower courts. The Court's fervent
language against the nonmovant's view could be read as a general dis-
taste for potentially shaky claims and a heavy reliance on the court's
ability to make that determination.9 6 The Court does not expressly
confine this attitude toward nonmovants in cases with video evidence.
Instead, the opinion simply refers to "the record."97 This signals that
the Court may have "broaden [ed] the authority ofjudges to intercept
weak cases rather than leaving them to jury decision."9 8 Judge Jack
Weinstein, a federal districtjudge, apparently views Scott from this per-
spective and has spoken out against the decision, stating that it is an
"unprecedented effort to displace the fact-finding power of the
jury."99 Judge Weinstein acknowledges that judges in the federal sys-
tem play an important role in "preventing our country from losing
sight of our destination and our goals and aspirations enshrined by
Lincoln."100
The other dominant interpretation of Scott emphasizes its unique
use of video evidence. Scott has been called "the YouTube" case, a
tribute to a link to the video that was posted on the Supreme Court
website next to the decision.101 For most commentators, the problem
with Scott is not that video evidence was used; rather, it is that the
Justices made value judgments about the tape.10 2 For example, the
tape was not used to establish simple, objective facts, such as determin-
95 See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 13, at 109-10; Weinstein, supra note 13, at 122-25.
96 See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007) ("That was the case here with
regard to the factual issue whether respondent was driving in such fashion as to
endanger human life. Respondent's version of events is so utterly discredited by the
record that no reasonable jury could have believed him.").
97 Scott, 550 U.S. at 380.
98 Marcus, supra note 13, at 109.
99 Weinstein, supra note 13, at 124.
100 Id. at 231.
101 See Scott v. Harris (Car 2) (YouTube online video Apr. 30, 2007), http://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=cmx8gzxlNik.
102 See, e.g., Dery, supra note 12, at 436-48; Dan M. Kahan et al., Whose Eyes Are You
Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARv. L. REV.
837, 881-87 (2009); Silbey, supra note 14, at 42-45; Wasserman, supra note 14, at
607-10; David Kessler, Comment, justices in the Jury Box: Video Evidence and Summary
Judgment in Scott v. Harris, 31 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 423, 430-35 (2008); Forrest
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ing whether a street light was red. Instead, the Justices looked at the
tape in order to make a value judgment concerning the reasonable-
ness of the conduct' 0 3-something that is dangerous precedent. 04
One extension of this interpretation calls for the removal of all
video evidence from summary judgment decisions because the pro-
cess of reviewing such evidence inherently causes judges to engage in
a weighing analysis-a job that should always be the responsibility of
thejury. 05 This interpretation is grounded in Stevens' dissent, which
argued that ajury from Georgia was best suited to watch the video and
use community standards evaluate whether the risk posed by Harris
justified excessive force. 06 Specifically in the appellate context, some
have argued that "when it comes to the summary judgment standard,
appellate courts should . . . not make use of the availability of mul-
timedia information."10 7 Judges post-Scott may evaluate video evi-
dence improperly, potentially usurping the jury's role in every case.108
Therefore, this type of evidence should be excluded from summary
judgment determinations altogether.109 The use of video evidence
simply gets too close to determinations of credibility and weight that
are uniquely shaped by the jury's own community standards, espe-
cially in factually intense issues like the Fourth Amendment's reasona-
bleness standard.110
Exclusion may not be the exclusive remedy to the problems of
video evidence seen in Scott. Instead, this tendency could be cor-
rected by the use of extreme caution in relying on video evidence."'1
Video evidence has been described as "seductive." 12 While video and
other forms of multimedia evidence appear to be disinterested, they
Plesko, Comment, (Im)Balance and (Un)Reasonableness: High-Speed Police Pursuits, the
Fourth Amendment, and Scott v. Harris, 85 DENV. U. L. REV. 463, 472-78 (2007).
103 See Scott, 550 U.S. at 378-81.
104 See supra note 102.
105 See, e.g., Schwartz et al., supra note 12, at 860-63 ("[D]espite the existence of a
videotape, the jury should normally be the finder of the facts."); Leah A. Walker,
Comment, Will Video Kill the Trial Courts' Star? How "Hot" Records Will Change the Appel-
late Process, 19 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 449, 451-65 (2009).
106 See supra notes 86-94 and accompanying text.
107 Walker, supra note 105, at 480.
108 See id. at 472-81.
109 See id.
110 See id. at 462-64.
111 See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
112 See Kessler, supra note 102, at 432-33 ("Video evidence, like that encountered
by the Court in Harris, is seductive.... This may lead courts to believe-overcon-
fidently-that how they view the evidence with their own eyes is the correct (and
only) version of what happened." (footnote omitted)).
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can often be biased toward one party or the other.1 13 For example, in
Scott, the video was taken from the dashboard of the police cruiser.11 4
Therefore, the viewer saw only the officer's perspective, not Harris's.
Film also has the ability to include some images, but exclude
others.' 1 5 Because of this bias, judges may wrongly refuse to look at
contradictory evidence because the video appears to be objective.' 16
Instead of cumulatively looking at the evidence and drawing infer-
ences in favor of the nonmoving party, judges post-Scott may be quick
to rely on video evidence, weighing it heavily against non-electronic
evidence.1 17 As one scholar observed about Scott, "[t]his may . . . be
the first time that the Supreme Court disregarded all other evidence
and declared the film version of the disputed events as the unassaila-
ble truth." 18 As long as judges resist tunnel vision, this group of
scholars believes that the use of video evidence can be important
when viewed cumulatively. Judges should just "resist the urge simply
to believe what they see."119 Film must be considered as one piece of
all the evidence, subject to the same biases and credibility issues.12 0
In addition to the inherent biases of the medium, judges can also
impart their own personal biases on to the video.12 1 This view is com-
monly referred to as the critique of "cognitive illiberalism"-the fail-
ure of judges to recognize the connection between perceptions of
societal risk and differing opinions of what society should ultimately
look like. 122 In the Scott context, cognitive illiberalism is seen when
the majority assumes that there is only one "reasonable" perspective of
the videotape. 12 3 The only empirical study of Scott demonstrates this
fallacy. Three law professors showed the Scott video to a sample of
113 See Silbey, supra note 14, at 18-19 ("From the earliest emergence of film tech-
nology, filmmakers and critics recognized that the appearance of reality in films is an
illusion based upon conventions of representation . . . ."); Wasserman, supra note 14,
at 624-25 ("Nor is the story the video told necessarily complete or fully contextual-it
did not show what was happening off-camera, what happened before the camera
began running, or the cause of the actions we see and hear on the video.").
114 See Harris v. Coweta County, No. 3:01-CV-148, 2003 WL 25419527, at *1 (N.D.
Ga. Sept. 25, 2003).
115 See Silbey, supra note 14, at 25-32.
116 See Dery, supra note 12, at 436-48; Silbey, supra note 14, at 20-25; Wasserman,
supra note 14, at 607-10.
117 See supra note 116.
118 See Silbey, supra note 14, at 17.
119 Kessler, supra note 102, at 435.
120 See supra note 113.
121 See Kahan et al., supra note 102, at 851-54.
122 See id. at 842-43.
123 See id. at 881-87.
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1350 Americans and asked for their interpretations.12 4 While a major-
ity of those surveyed did agree with the Court that Scott acted reasona-
bly, several sub-communities did not.125 Among those were African
Americans, low-income workers, Northeast residents, and people who
tended to lean toward the left politically. 26 Instead of focusing on
the inherent flaws of video evidence, these professors argued that the
Scott Court was wrong to substitute its own view of the video as fact.127
Harris should have had the ability to present it to ajury that (1) may
have brought different biases to the video, and (2) may have been
informed and persuaded by Harris's version of the event.128 This
argument does not suggest eliminating video evidence altogether;
rather, it suggests that a judge should "engage in a sort of mental
double check when ruling on a motion that would result in summary
adjudication."' 2 9 While this empirical study exposed an important
fact about the Justices' evaluation of the evidence, it did not evaluate
whether judges have indeed engaged in that mental double check
when ruling on motions after Scott.
Prior to this empirical work, commentators have made arguments
about the impact of Scott based on theory, with only a few case exam-
ples.130 No scholar has actually looked at what impact Scott has had on
the lower courts. The value of empiricism is slowly becoming known
to the legal world: "Since we all became Realists, it is difficult to ques-
tion the utility of empirical information."1 3 1 Helpful empirical
research has been done in many contexts, including pleadings, settle-
ments, trials, and the appeal process.' 3 2 Especially in the context of
summary judgment, empirical evidence has been limited until just
recently. 33 Most agree that summary judgment is important because
124 See id. at 854.
125 See id. at 864-81.
126 See id. at 854.
127 See id. at 881-87.
128 See id. at 881-906.
129 Id. at 898.
130 See, e.g., Dery, supra note 12, at 436-48; Schwartz, supra note 12, at 860-63;
Silbey, supra note 14, at 974-88; Wasserman, supra note 14, at 626-36.
131 Marcus, supra note 13, at 113 (also explaining several common problems with
empirical studies conducted by lawyers).
132 See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont, Litigation Realities Redux, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1919, 1921-73 (2009).
133 See id. at 1941-42. For some of the recent studies on summary judgment, see
Cecil et al., supra note 21; Samuel Issacharoff & George Loewenstein, Second Thoughts
About Summary Judgment, 100 YALE L.J. 73, 91 (1990); Brian N. Lizotte, Publication of
Summary Judgment Motions, 2007 Wis. L. REv. 107; Mollica, supra note 26. One of the
oldest empirical studies on summary judgment was done in the late 1970s. See Wil-
[VOL. 85-41772
RACE TO JUDGMENT?
it eliminates many cases that do not require trial.'34 But debate is
lively regarding the cases at the margins.13 5 How stringent should our
standards of summary judgment be? How many cases are we comfort-
able keeping out of court before trial? Empirical research is needed
to craft better discussions about how summary judgment should move
forward.' 3 6 Before proposing amendments to Rule 56 or advancing
theories about Scott, one must know exactly what kind of impact Scott
is having.13 7
II. METHODOLOGY
Two questions drove my study: First, in general, what kind of
effect is the attitude in Scott having on all federal district court deci-
sions on summary judgment motions? Second, in particular, how are
federal district courts using Scott in their decisions, especially in cases
that are factually similar? This study answers these questions by exam-
ining 56(c) motions for summary judgment. I made this choice for
several reasons. First, Scott actually concerned a 56(c) motion for
summary judgment and it was within those boundaries that the Jus-
tices examined the evidence.13 8 Furthermore, summary judgment
challenges the legal sufficiency of a claim or defense before trial.139
Because the troublesome areas of Scott dealt with the evaluation of
evidence, summary judgment motions are preferable to motions to
dismiss because summary judgment motions can rely on more than
just the pleadings.140 This study does not include Rule 50 judgments
as a matter of law even though the standards are the same because I
wanted to measure the effect Scott had on cases that had not been
presented at trial. Fundamentally, a paper trial and a physical trial
present different perspectives on evidence.141 At the summary judg-
ment stage, a judge may wonder what evidence or credibility issues
liam P. McLauchlan, An Empirical Study of the Federal Summary Judgment Rule, 6J. EMPIR-
IcAL LEGAL STUD. 427 (1977).
134 See Clermont, supra note 132, at 1940-46.
135 See id.
136 See id.
137 In addition to supporting arguments about how legal rules should change in
the future, empirical studies also serve to hold the judiciary accountable. See Rebecca
Love Kourlis & Pamela A. Gagel, Reinstalling the Courthouse Windows: Using Statistical
Data to Promote judicial Transparency and Accountability in Federal and State Courts, 53
VILL. L. REV. 951, 954-60 (2008).
138 See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378-81 (2007).
139 See IOA WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 5, § 2712.
140 See id. § 2713.
141 See id. § 2713.1.
2010] 1773
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
will occur at trial.142 Finally, summary judgment motions have a finite
set of possible outcomes, which is essential to crafting an empirical
study. When faced with a motion for summary judgment, ajudge may
either grant, deny, or deny-in-part/grant-in-part ("mixed") the
motion. Therefore, this study examines the granted, denied, and
mixed rates before and after Scott.
I limited my search to federal district court cases gathered from
the commercial database Westlaw.143 While several scholars have
expressed apprehension about the use of commercial databases in
empirical work about summary judgments, 144 I was not attempting to
establish absolute rates of dismissal in federal district courts. Nor was
this study meant to measure the increase or decrease in total summary
judgment motions made. Instead, I sought to examine the relative
rates before and after Scott. While many dismissals are not published
through commercial databases (therefore not corresponding with the
dismissal rates seen in reported cases), this reported "bias" is evident
in both the pre- and post-Scott datasets and, thus, this method still
provides a useful vehicle for analysis.
Because the Scott decision was handed down over two years ago, it
was also important 'to determine the appropriate time frame for the
study. As time passes after a landmark Supreme Court case, the effect
of the case could potentially stabilize as lawyers adopt their arguments
and case strategies to the new precedent. While this problem may not
be as prevalent in the summary judgment motion context as opposed
to the pleading context,145 I sought to limit the time span so that the
majority of the motions were drafted before or immediately after Scott,
giving attorneys less time to adjust to the particulars of the case. A
competing interest was pulling enough cases that cited Scott to provide
a useful and statistically significant comparison. With these interests
in mind, I decided to examine decisions on summary judgment
motions handed down within a year before or after Scott. These time
frames allowed me. to evaluate how lower federal district courts had
142 See id.
143 All cases in this study were obtained from the Westlaw federal district court
database (DCT).
144 See, e.g., Cecil et al., supra note 21, at 869-73 ("Because the denial of a sum-
mary judgment motion may not generate a formal opinion that meets standards for
publication or inclusion in a computerized legal reference system, these instances
escape the notice of scholars who rely on only published opinions.").
145 Summary judgment deals with evidence, as opposed to a 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss that only evaluates a claim on its face. It is easier for a lawyer to manipulate
the wording of a pleading than the actual evidence. See 10A WRIGHT ET AL., supra
note 5, § 2713.
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applied Rule 56(c) in the few months surrounding Scott and radiating
outward.
I ran two Westlaw searches-one for cases a year before Scott and
one for cases a year after Scott-in the federal district court database
for cases that included the phrase "summary judgment" within a para-
graph of the phrases "genuine issue" and "material fact" or "56(c)."146
14,603 cases with those key words were available for the year before
Scott and 15,079 cases with those key words were available for the year
after Scott. Because of the time constraints of this study, it was impossi-
ble to code approximately 30,000 cases; therefore, I needed a method
of sampling. I divided the cases into three groups: (1) all cases pre-
Scott, (2) all cases post-Scott that did not include a citation to Scott, and
(3) all cases post-Scott that cited Scott only for its summary judgment
precedents. 147 I then used a random number generator to sample
cases from each group.1 48 By using this division of cases, I was able to
compare not only summary judgment rates before and after Scott, but
also the rates within two groups after Scott. Because Scott did not hand
down a clear alteration of the summary judgment standard,14 9 it is
possible that the liberal attitude portrayed by the Justices in Scott influ-
enced judges when deciding motions, but, without similar facts, made
a citation to the case impractical. Not only did this comparison allow
me to examine the general outcome of Scott, it also allowed sugges-
tions to be made about how far the case extends beyond its facts.
In the course of the study, it was necessary to eliminate three
types of cases. First, summary judgment decisions by federal magis-
trates made pursuant to the Magistrates Act 5 0 were excluded if they
did not have the force of law.' 51 District court decisions that granted,
146 I ran these searches on October 18, 2009. A Microsoft Excel spreadsheet list-
ing the name and citation of every case included in this study is on file with the
author.
147 See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
148 I used the Microsoft Excel random number generator to generate a list of
nonrepeating random numbers. I then read the cases with the corresponding
Westlaw case numbers. The random number results are on file with the author.
149 See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378-81 (2007) (operating within the current
framework). Scott did not change the actual wording of the summary judgment stan-
dard. Compare Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957) (holding that the plead-
ing requirement was "no set of facts"), with Bell Ad. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
556-63 (2007) (abrogating Conley by requiring that the pleadings be "plausible").
150 28 U.S.C.A. § 636(b) (1) (West 2006 & Supp. 2009).
151 Decisions where the parties consented to trial before a magistrate judge were
included because those decisions have the binding force of law. Decisions made by
magistrate judges that were only advisory to the district judge were not included. See
id.
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denied, or mixed motions for summary judgment after a review of the
magistrate's recommendation were included. Second, cases that cited
Scott only in the context of its discussion of excessive force substantive
law were excluded because this study is intended to measure the effect
of Scott on the procedural aspect of summary judgment motions.152
Last, cases that discussed summary judgment standards in other con-
texts beside decisions on actual motions were excluded.153
I randomly sampled 250 cases from each of the three groups.
Having obtained these lists, I read each case and recorded a variety of
information: the case citation, the date of the case, the district court
issuing the ruling, the result of the motion (granted, denied, mixed),
the moving party, and the general type of case (civil rights, contracts,
torts, and other). I also looked for the presence of specific factual
similarities: whether the case dealt with video evidence, excessive
force, or qualified immunity. A total of 750 cases were coded. 154 The
following results were calculated from these datasets.
III. RESULTS
As Table 1 illustrates, I first analyzed the granted, denied, and
mixed rates of the control group (the cases decided pre-Scott) so I
could evaluate the consistency among the group.
TABLE 1. OVERALL RESULTS FOR CASES PRE-Scorr
Denied Granted Mixed
(Total) (Total) (Total)
Total 14.8% 64.4% 20.8%
(250) (37) (161) (52)
Summer 2006* 13.8% 67% 19.1%
(94) (13) (63) (18)
Winter 2006** 16.9% 66.1% 16.9%
(59) (10) (39) (10)
Spring 2007*** 14.4% 60.8% 24.7%
(97) (14) (59) (24)
* Summer includes months May through September
** Winter includes months October through December
*** Spring includes months January through April
Due to rounding errors, percentages may not sum to 100%
152 See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
153 For example, if a later decision traced the case's history.




The denial rates show a great deal of consistency within the con-
trol group. The rates fluctuated at a rough 3.1% band (between
16.9% at the high end and 13.8% at the low end). Likewise, between
summer 2006 and winter 2006, the granted and mixed rates were very
consistent (0.9% and 2.2% bands respectively). In the spring of 2007,
however, there was a decrease in grant rates and an increase in mixed
results. This suggests that there may be another factor occurring
before Scott that had an impact on summary judgment rates. Having
calculated these results, I then compared them to decisions on 56(c)
summary judgment motions after Scott. These results are shown in
Table 2.
TABLE 2. OVERALL RESULTS FOR CASES POST-SCoT
Denied Granted Mixed
(Total) (Total) (Total)J
Total Post-Scott, 9.6% 62% 28.4%
citing Scott (24) (155) (71)
(250)
Summer 2007 8.5% 61% 30.5%
(82) (7) (50) (25)
Winter 2007 11.8% 58.8% 29.4%
(51) (6) (30) (15)
Spring 2008 9.4% 64.1% 26.5%
(117) (11) (75) (31)
Total Post-Scott, 14.8% 58% 27.2%
not citing Scott (37) (145) (68)
(250)
Summer 2007 13% 60.9% 26.1%
(138) (18) (84) (36)
Winter 2007 16.3% 55.8% 27.9%
(43) (7) (24) (12)
Spring 2008 17.4% 53.6% 29%
(69) (12) (37) (20)
Looking at the total denial rates, the denial rates of the cases
post-Scott but not citing Scott and the cases pre-Scott are identical
(14.8%). In contrast, the total denial rate for those cases citing Scott is
more than five points below the average. This indicates that Scott may
be having an impact on the denial rate of summary judgment
motions. In the mixed category, the numbers seem to continue along
the same pattern observed in the control group, with granted rates
generally decreasing and mixed rulings increasing.
After observing these general trends, I ran a multinomial regres-
sion to see if the changes were statistically significant. This was accom-
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plished by transferring the variables into the statistical program SPSS
and running a regression analysis on the data.155 The regression anal-
ysis suggested that Scott had little to no statistically significant impact
on the change observed in the rates except in the denial category.
Summary judgment motions that were in group 1 and group 2 (before
Scott and after Scott but not citing Scott) were more likely to be denied
than those motions in group 3 (those citing Scott).156
The results suggest that Scott is having an impact on cases that
actually cite it. Therefore, I attempted some descriptive analysis of
how district courts were actually using Scott. Regression analysis indi-
cated that judges were more likely to cite Scott in cases that dealt with
video/audio evidence, excessive force, and qualified immunity, sug-
gesting that judges are primarily using Scott in factually similar
cases.1 57 Regression analysis was unable to confirm any statistical sig-
nificance in the denial rates between one substantive area and
another. At this point, the data show that Scott is having a statistical
impact on cases citing it. Exactly where the impact lies cannot be
determined without larger sample sizes.158
Because most scholars looked at Scott's treatment of the videotape
evidence, my last analysis examined the impact Scott has had on video
evidence.
TABLE 3. SCOTT AND VIDEOTAPE EVIDENCE
Denied Granted Mixed
(Total) (Total) (Total)
Post-Scott, 3% 57.6% 39.4%
citing Scott (1) (19) (13)
(33)
Post-Scott, 0% 100% 0%
not citing Scott (0) (1) (0)
(1)
Pre-Scott 0% 66.7% 33.3%
(3) (0) (2) (1)
The small numbers contained in the case groups pre-Scott and
post-Scott not citing Scott were not large enough to determine statisti-
cal significance. The table shows that district courts did look at video
155 SPSS database on file with author.
156 R = .05, P<.012.
157 This was statistically significant at P<.001. Judges were also more likely to cite
Scott in civil rights cases rather than cases classified as contracts, torts, or other.
158 For example, are there decreased denial rates in every substantive area citing
Scott or just in some?
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evidence pre-Scott. Interestingly, district judges did not deny any
motions in those cases. What is noteworthy is the fact that district
judges examined three cases of videotape evidence before Scott and a
startling thirty-six cases after Scott. While these numbers are not dis-
positive, they may suggest a trend following Scott.
IV. ANALYSIS
My two questions going into the study examined Scott on two
levels. First, in general, what kind of effect is the attitude in Scott hav-
ing on all federal district court decisions on summary judgment
motions? Second, in particular, how are federal district courts using
Scott in their decisions, especially in cases that are factually similar?
This Part examines the results in the context of these two questions,
providing explanation and analysis. The first section addresses the
first question of overall impact. The second section addresses Scott's
impact within the context of video evidence.
A. Overall Results
The data suggests that Scott has not had any substantive impact on
overall summary judgment rates. The percentages show a trend in the
change of rates beginning right before Scott and continuing after.
This suggests that another factor besides the Scott decision influenced
the summary judgment rates for these two years. Determining that
factor is outside the scope of this study. These data appears to rebut
the argument of some that Scott signals a new, more liberal attitude
toward all summary judgment motions.159 Scott has been read as the
Supreme Court's blanket encouragement of summary judgment
motions.160 These data appear to reject this particular interpretation
of Scott. This section of the Note offers two plausible theories for why
Scott seems to be having no impact on overall summary judgment
rates.
First, district courtjudges may disagree with the Supreme Court's
decision in Scott and may be attempting to limit its potential impact.
In researching Scott, one is hard pressed to find any scholar who is
comfortable with the Court's use of summary judgment. That discom-
fort seems to have been transferred to the judiciary. At least one fed-
159 In fact, the denial rates between those cases post-Scott not citing Scott and pre-
Scott were identical (14.8%).
160 See Clermont, supra note 132, at 1942 ("Just three weeks before Bell Atlantic,
the Supreme Court stepped in to encourage use of summary judgment as another way
for judges to short circuit litigation, with the Court taking a very activist role in draw-
ing inferences from the record in order to reverse a denial of summary judgment.").
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eral district judge has spoken out against the Court's attitude toward
summary judgment in Scott.16 1 According to Judge Weinstein, the
"Supreme Court majority [in Scott] intervened against jury power." 162
Weinstein worries that fellow district judges may be granting more
summary judgment motions because of Scott. The data seem to sug-
gest that this is in fact not the case. It is possible that many district
judges feel similarly to Weinstein and are refusing to take Scott as an
invitation to grant more summary judgment motions. In cases where
the Supreme Court has not actually changed a standard, but instead
advocated one particular policy position, district court judges are the
true gauge. There is greater room for interpretation when courts are
operating within the standard. In this case, it may be that district
courts have chosen to interpret Scott as narrowly as possible out of
discomfort with the result.
Second, and perhaps more likely, district court judges may simply
be applying Scott as the Supreme Court intended. The Supreme
Court's decision may best be interpreted as confined to its facts rather
than as a sweeping endorsement of summary judgment.16 3 After set-
ting out the usual standards for summary judgment, Justice Scalia
emphasized that "[t]here is . . . an added wrinkle in this case: exis-
tence in the record of a videotape."1 64 The majority's opinion focused
so single-mindedly on the videotape that it is hard to read the opinion
as applicable to anything but that unique kind of evidence. In fact,
the Court held that its entire reason for reversing the court of appeals
was the lower court's lack of reliance on the videotape: "The Court of
Appeals should not have relied on such visible fiction; it should have
viewed the facts in the light depicted by the videotape." 165 Based on
this interpretation, Scott should not be having an impact on the sum-
mary judgment rates of any cases other than those factually similar.
Therefore, the finding that Scott is having no statistical impact on sum-
mary judgment rates for cases not citing Scott should not be surpris-
ing. The lack of impact may simply be explained by the fact that
district court judges are applying Scott as it was meant to be applied.
161 See, e.g., Weinstein, supra note 13, at 124.
162 Id.
163 By "sweeping" I mean even beyond the defense of summary judgment seen in
the trilogy. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986) ("Summary judg-
ment procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but
rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed 'to
secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.'" (quoting
FED. R. Civ. P. 1)).
164 Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007).
165 Id. at 380-81.
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B. The Added Wrinkle
For cases actually citing Scott, the data suggest that Scott does lead
to a decreased denial rate in summary judgment motions. It is impor-
tant to note that this does not necessarily mean that cases that were
being denied pre-Scott are now being granted. The data did not show
a significant increase in granted rates. It is likely that these cases are
simply spread out between the granted and mixed categories. How-
ever, Scott does seem to result in some claims being barred ultimately
from a jury, whether through a granted or mixed result.
The data suggest that Scott's impact is limited to cases that actu-
ally cite Scott. Therefore, it is useful to see exactly how judges are
using Scott. The results imply that judges are largely confining Scott to
cases that are factually similar. 166 However, judges are not solely cit-
ing Scott in cases that involve unique multimedia evidence. In fact,
out of the 250 of the cases sampled citing Scott, only thirty-three of
those dealt with videotape evidence.167 These data suggest that dis-
trict court judges are not limiting Scott only to its unique and contro-
versial use of video evidence.168 It has been broadened to extend to
cases that deal with other factual similarities like excessive force and
qualified immunity cases.169 While the numbers on both sides of the
case are not large enough to reach statistical significance, the percent-
ages suggest possible trends going forward. Therefore, this section
will focus on how district court judges are using Scott specifically with
regard to video evidence.
Thirty-three cases citing Scott deal with video evidence, a shocking
increase from the three cases seen pre-Scott.170 There are several pos-
sible explanations for this large increase. One may be that as time
passes more technology has become available for use in the court-
room."'7 While this may be a plausible explanation for cases a decade
166 While the results did show that Scott is being cited in cases that do not involve
similar facts, regression analysis showed that judges were very unlikely to cite to Scott
in cases categorized contracts, torts, and other. See discussion supra Part III. Judges
were more likely to cite to Scott in cases categorized civil rights. See discussion supra
Part III. Statistical significance in denial rates was not discoverable for each substan-
tive area through regression analysis. At this point, the data shows that Scott has a
statistical influence on denial rates. What substantive areas are affected is still
unknown. See discussion supra Part III.
167 See discussion supra Part III.
168 See discussion supra Part I.C.
169 I only included cases in this study that cited Scott in the context of the summary
judgment standard, not in the context of qualified immunity. See supra note 65.
170 See discussion supra Part III.
171 See Wasserman, supra note 14, at 614-19.
2010] 1781
1782 NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW [VOL. 85:4
ago, this study examined a limited time frame. The availability of
technology on police cars and in prison cells likely did not increase
that much from 2006 to 2007. It is, however, still a viable explanation,
especially when one considers the possibility that police departments
have read Scott and decided to increase the use of video cameras to aid
in future lawsuits.17 2
A more likely explanation is twofold: (1) parties are more likely
to rely on multimedia evidence in support of their summary judgment
motion; and (2) courts are more likely to examine and emphasize that
evidence. With this decision, parties may be more likely to try and
admit video- and audiotapes if they believe that the evidence weighs
strongly in their favor.1 73 In turn, courts may be more willing to
examine video evidence. Even in Scott, the district court made no
mention of the videotape in its analysis except to note that it
existed.1 74 The court instead focused on the testimony of the two par-
ties, reading inferences toward Harris's version of the facts.17 5 Post-
Scott, it is hard to ignore the Supreme Court's strongly worded admon-
ishment that courts are not to rely on "visible fiction."1 76 As discussed
previously, the most limiting interpretation of Scott confines the case
to video evidence. While limited, the Supreme Court was clear that
courts should examine videotape evidence as part of the summary
judgment analysis. District courts appear to no longer be ignoring
video evidence and at the least will view the tape. It is what they are
doing with that viewing that is cause for concern.1 7 7
Next, I examined how the courts used the video evidence in the
thirty-three cases citing Scott that dealt with video evidence. A review
of the decisions showed that some courts did use the tapes to make
what would be considered "value judgments," mainly within the con-
text of reasonableness.17 8 Other district judges used the video evi-
172 See id.
173 See Silbey, supra note 14, at 34-38.
174 See Harris v. Coweta County, No. 3:01-CV-148, 2003 WL 25419527, at *1 (N.D.
Ga. Sept. 25, 2003).
175 See id. at *2.
176 Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380-81 (2007).
177 See supra notes 101-29 and accompanying text.
178 See, e.g., Bates v. Arata, No. C 05-3383, 2008 WL 820578, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Mar.
26, 2008) (finding that the videotape displayed conduct that was "reasonable under
the circumstances"); Ashbrook v. Boudinot, No. C2-06-140, 2007 WL 4270658, at *4
(S.D. Ohio Dec. 3, 2007) (finding that the suspect "veered dangerously" and the
officer used "minimal force"); McCabe v. Macaulay, 515 F. Supp. 2d 944, 968 (N.D.
Iowa 2007) (finding that the videotape showed plaintiffs were "fully compliant");
Miller v. Jensen, No. 06-CV-0328, 2007 WL 1574761, at *5 (N.D. Okla. May 29, 2007)
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dence to establish only objective facts.179 Assuming that the weight of
literature discussing the harmful effects of "value judgments" is cor-
rect, this brief sample suggests that scholars should be rightly con-
cerned about how video evidence is being used post-Scott. What, then,
is the proper remedy?
These facts do not support a ban on all video evidence. In some
cases, video evidence has been extremely helpful in establishing cer-
tain objective facts. For example, in one case, the district judge was
able to see whether or not the police officer touched the plaintiff at
all.180 The videotape showed that the plaintiff had lied about the
actions of the police officer. 81 This suggests that district court judges
are not always swayed by video evidence and, in fact, can properly use
it to weed out undeserving claims. While video proved to be too
seductive for the Justices on the Supreme Court, who used the tape in
Scott to establish more than just objective facts, it appears that video
evidence is not necessarily too seductive. Judges can and have used it
wisely, even in light of Scott.
But the warnings of some commentators are real.' 82 While a
complete ban on video evidence does not appear to be necessary, the
data supports the admonishment to be cautious in these decisions.
Scott has been used by many district court judges to make value judg-
ments that should be left to the jury.18 3 These judgments inevitably
come in the context of particularly sticky areas like reasonableness
and excessive force.184 While the chase in Scott may have seemed like
a "Hollywood-style car chase of the most frightening sort" 85 to Scalia,
it might have appeared tamer to the members of a Georgia jury.186
Indeed, two lower courts, both arguably closer to the community in
Georgia than the Supreme Court, held that there was a genuine issue
("After viewing the three videotapes ... the Court finds with little difficulty that Jen-
sen's actions were objectively reasonable.").
179 See, e.g., Jones v. Castro, No. SA-6-CA-846, 2007 WL 3396500, at *3 (W.D. Tex.
Nov. 13, 2007) ("The videotape shows the officers restrained Jones, escorted him back
to his cell, and did not punch, hit, kick, or otherwise assaultJones as he alleges.");
Asociacion de Periodistas de P.R. v. Mueller, No. 06-1931, 2007 WL 5312566, at *6
(D.P.R.June 12, 2007) ("In the present case, however, Plaintiffs dispute the accuracy
and authenticity of Defendants' DVD. We, therefore, base our discussion on Plain-
tiffs' version of the facts . . . ." (citation omitted)).
180 See Jones, 2007 WL 3396500, at *3.
181 See id.
182 See supra notes 101-29 and accompanying text.
183 See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
184 See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
185 See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007).
186 See id. at 398-97 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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of material fact.187 It appears that the troubling attitude of the Scott
Court may have carried over to some district courts. In evaluating
these cases, district court judges should be wary of the two potential
traps identified by the literature: (1) treating video and audio evi-
dence as disinterested and objective 8 s and (2) making judgments
that should be best left to the community because of the judge's own
inherent biases about what may be reasonable (cognitive illiberal-
ism). 189 It appears that some judges, along with the Supreme Court,
have fallen into the first trap of summary judgment: "weigh[ing] con-
flicting evidence (the job of the jury)."190
CONCLUSION
Is the concern of scholars post-Scott warranted? In some ways,
this study suggests that we need not sound the alarm. Scott itself has
had little statistical impact on the rates of summary judgments. It
appears that it has not had a general influence on all summary judg-
ment rates. Within these results, it is important to note that this
empirical study, while providing a useful first cut at the data, has limi-
tations that should spark-not reduce-scholarly interest in the case.
Most significantly, this study only examined published cases within the
two years surrounding Scott. Because Scott is relatively new to sum-
maryjudgmentjurisprudence, its effects may not be seen until farther
down the road. Additionally, the pre-Scott trend, which actually saw a
reduction in granted rates and an increase in mixed rates, is deserving
of more empirical analysis.
The data do suggest that Scott was the reason for decreased denial
rates in cases that cited Scott. Further empirical work needs to be
done to determine if this significance is true across all substantive
areas of the law or only in certain ones. However, the results suggest
that courts are more likely to cite Scott in cases that are factually simi-
lar. While there is not a statistically significant use of Scott for video
evidence, the recent increase in the use of video and audio evidence
post-Scott may be a reason not to dismiss Scott as an anomaly. If district
courts are, as this study suggests, more willing to examine and empha-
size video evidence post-Scott, then the practical effects on claims
187 See Harris v. Coweta County, 433 F.3d 807, 816 & n.11 (11th Cir. 2005); Harris
v. Coweta County, No. 3:01-CV-148, 2003 WL 25419527, at *1-7 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 25,
2003).
188 See supra notes 101-20 and accompanying text.
189 See supra notes 121-29 and accompanying text.
190 In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig., 295 F.3d 651, 655 (7th Cir.
2002).
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could be large. The results appear to support many scholars' con-
cerns about the temptation of video evidence in the judge's chambers.
The fact that some judges are indeed taking their cue from Scott and
veering into what used to be a jury's role is cause for concern. While
not significant yet, these preliminary results should caution judges to
be cautious and mindful when reviewing certain hot evidence.
This Note provides the first empirical look at the impact of Scott
on summary judgment motions. While limited, this study is a useful
means of analysis that invites continued empirical data. Summary
judgment is an important vehicle for promoting the efficiency of the
federal court system. Because of the significant ramifications of a
granted summary judgment motion, the line must be carefully drawn.
It is in the examination of the cases at the margin, like Scott v. Harris,
where this debate is most productive.
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